too obvious. The memory of World War Il with its claims and counterclaims to national Lebensruum stdl weighs heavily; and when we add to that memory the frustrated history of the United (sic) Nations, such nationalist careerism as the U.S. misadventure in Vietnam, and the present possibility of a general holocaust because some nuclear power's sensibilities have been sufficiently offended, little more is needed to understand why the ideas, let alone the ideals, of nationalism and patriotism should be addressed with suspicion.
On the other hand, the apparent disarray of our culture-the sudden flashes of communal and individual temper, the rapid loss of tradition, the skewed economies, the improbabilities of mass e d u c a t i o d l this might well evoke nostalgia for what appears h memory as a tidier and more settled past, in which love of country was an important factor and symbolic of the whole. Whatever the nation-state may have done that it shouldn't have, the citizens of the state still knew that it was theirs, or at least that they were its. They knew what the state could require of them, and they accepted their duties as a condition of the rights that came with them. They recognized. therefore, the principal grounds of rights and duties themselves. In short, there prevailed a sense of collective interest and purpose that gave substance to individual aspirations as well as to those of the p u p . The loss of this sense is a serious loss in a society such as ours that bas found nothing to replace it.
So, at least, goes Moms Janowitz's brief history of a patriotic Eden and of the fall from it. His subtitle, "Education for Civic
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Consciousness," suggests just how he believes the virtues of the past can be recaptured in the present. He acknowledges that significant political and social changes have occurred since the heyday of the patriotism that he takes as a paradigm: the social conscience of the citizen-soldiers who fought in the American Revolution. But even now, in the post-post-revolutionary United States, there is the possibility of at least a "moral equivalent of war" (in the phrase from William James that Janowitz admires). Thus he prescribes a period of obligatory national service for young Americans. This would, among other things, provide a replacement for the current volunteer and mercenary army to which he objects. Janowilz also prescribes more intense c o m e s on civics in the schools. better pay for teachers. who would then be of higher "mental caliber" than the present ones, and greater ease in hing those who do not measure up.
If all this sounds more like cocktail-hour resentiment after a hard day at the office than like social analysis by a distinguished professor of sociology, the fault, it seems to me, is entirely with the author. Janowitz has ignored not only his own discipline but history and philosophy as well, and this can be seen most directly in the questions he omits from this book. What is it that originally produced the "civic consciousness" he extolls? What are the social causes or forces that have more recently acted against it? H a there been a proportionate increase in, "personal hedonism"-Janowitz's allpurpose phrase for the "value" that he alleges has displaced patriotism? Is patriotism possible without the often accompanying evils of nationalism? All these questions seem capable of empirical scrutiny, but Janowitz hardly pauses over them. The quasihistorical intuitions he would substitute for evidence do not inspire confidence. To base an argument for patriotism on the example of the militias in the American Revolution and then on the subsequent history of conscription in the United States would not be overly persuasive, even if the militias had been effective both in military terms and as indications of a general civic consciousness. Janowitz himself admits doubts about the militias. They were less important in fighting the Revolution than was the m y , and anyone with recent experience of the National Guard would almost certainly argue that things must be worse now.
Professor Janowitz is no doubt sincere in his belief that patriotism is an important, perhaps the primary, civic virtue and closely tied to whatever else occurs in a society.
Some of his recommendations-for example, the importance of replacing the volunteer army-are compelling in their own right. But his discussion is so emotional that the most important theoretical and even the practical issues surrounding the phenomenon of patriotism are never even for-,mulated systematically. What, for instance, i s the relation of patriotism to other social forms of identity, to ethnicity, to religion? To propose for a mass, technological, and liagmented society like the United States that civic commitment be revived by a verrion of "consciousness-raising'' reflects a view of historical causality that might be understandable for someone writing in the 1i:ighteenth century but in contemporary t m n s leads nowhere. As if the economic, social, and technological forces that have produced the present tensions and incompatibilities could simply be talked away. Professor Janowitz might try spending a day teaching civics in an inner-city school to see the improbability of his recommendatn.ons.
Benedict Anderson addresses the issues raised by nationalism and patriotism much more seriously than does Janowitz, attempting to view them as features of culture that have first a history and then a structure which emerges from that history. The histoiical role of nationalism is tied closely to the: rise of the nation-state, which Anderson considers from its origin in the sixteenth century and down to the current day.
, This is an important distinction; it moves to "naturalize" nationalism, suggesting, against most accounts. that nationalism has both an inside and an outside and that we need to take account of it in the imagination as well as in its extemal causes. The line of explanation that Anderson follows is at once eccentric and enlightening. In a number of places, to be sure, he acknowledges the standard explanations of nationalism as related to changes in the pattems of commerce and economic development. His own emphasis, however, is on language, literacy, and the wide-ranging effects of the printing press. These features of social history may seem altogether remote from questions of political organization, but it is precisely those whose abstract views of historical change assume the irrelevance of these factors that Anderson means to dispute. He thus argues persuasively, it seems to me, for the causal relation, singly and then together, of the failing dominance of Latin, the development of vemacular languages to replace it, andmost important-the spread of "print capitalism" as agents in the "imagining" that led people eventually to identify themselves and others in terms of national affiliation. The evidence he cites for this complex thesis is itself complex, moving beyond the standard examples of modem European history to the nationalist movements toward independence that accompanied the colonization of South and North America and then to recent developments in Southeast Asia. the area of his own special interest.
It would be unlikely that any single hypothesis could fully cover such a diversity of cultures and periods. 
Philip Sicker
It is now almost fifteen years since the translation of Gabriel Garcla Mhquez's One Hundred Years ofSoiOlifude awakened in English-speaking readers a stillgrowing fascination for Latin American literature. Today, works by such contemporary fabulists as Julio Cortazar, Carlos Fuentes, and Jorge Amado appear almost weekly in newly translated paperback editions and are displayed on bookstore shelves like rows of exotic fruit. The sudden popularity of a fiction heretofore unknown has engendered the prevailing misconception that the literary tradition of an entire continent begins and ends with these more recent works. Hence the irony that Mario de Andrade's 1928 Brazilian fantasy will strike many North American readers as a footnote to Mhquez. Random House, publisher of the first English translation, contributes to this misapprehension by describing the work as "a matchless example of magical realism." Magical this blend of folklore, allegory, and rhapsody surely is. but it isno more a work of realism than is "Rumplestiltskin" and no more a novel than Petronius' Satyricon. Rather, Macirnaima stands as the centerpiece of a more circumscribed tradition-Brazilian modernism.
Unlike the modemist movement of Spanish-speaking Latin America, which began in the 1890s under the influence of the French Symbolists and fin de sikle decadence in Europe, the modernism of Portuguese-speaking Brazil was a nationalistic response to class realignment. incipient industrialism, and economic growth in the country before and during World War 1. Far from holding to the doctrine of art for art's sake prevalent in Mexico and Argentina, Andrade sought nothing less than to define the vastly complex national character of his homeland and to present a symbolic history of Brazil. Drawing upon his studies in anthropology. Andrade located the roots and stryctures of Brazilian national life in the myths of its almost extinct Indian population. But Macunaima, the titular hero, is not merely an atavistic noble savage. Born of a Tapanhuma Indian in "the virgin forest of the Uraricoera River," his skin is not tawny but "black as calcined ivory." Later, after washing in the magical waters of St. Thomas's footprint, he becomes as white as the missionaries and conquistadors who began to infiltrate the country in the sixteenth century. Picaro, magician. and quester, he is, in Andrade's words, "a hero without groups as English it needs to be added, nourished a new, racist mythology), Anderson plots the parallel courses of nationalism and language. He thus adds to other recent work, like that by Elisabeth Eisenstein and Robert Darnton, which trace to the growing print-culture of the sixteenth century consequences that extend far beyond the specific content of the texts printed. The medium, it turns out, is more than the message.
To be sure, lurking beyond much of Anderson's analysis is a general conception of language as a decisive element in the imagined life of communities and individuals, one by which they establish their identities. This thesis in its theoretical form-for example, in its presupposition of an intrinsic relation between language and thoughtAnderson hardly touches. But if one grants only the minimal premise that language is a central element in social life, then the parallels that Anderson points out between the changing forms of language and their organization, on the one hand, and social structure in its other forms, on the other, have important implications. Certainly they serve as a useful counterweight to the accounts of nationalism that take class structure and economic development as the single fulcrum around which everything else in political life generally, and the rise of nationalism particularly, revolves. As both the idealist and Marxist historians have learned to their cost (Anderson neatly points out that the persistence of nationalism remains an enigma for the Marxist), historical effects can also become causes-and however one identifies the causes that produced the vernacular languages of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or that led to Gutenberg's discovery, the consequences of rhese events quite evidently took on a life and causality of their own.
Anderson The notion that foreign domination and social injustice in Muslim lands is the result of religious apostasy should not surprise the Westem reader. It is another example of what Amold Toynbee called "Zealotism"-a kind of "archaism evoked by foreign pressure," whose hallmark is the perceived link between political dependence and religious dereliction-a theme that has exercised a great influence in all three of the Semitic, monotheistic religions. This tendency is shared by the Maccabees and the original Zealots of Jewish history, and also by some Christian fundamentalists in the United States today. To "Zealotism" Toynbee opposed what he called "Herodianism," a form of mimetic cosmopolitanism that seeks to assimilate the methods and culture of hegemonic foreigners. While Herodianism may seem to us a more sensible and effective response to political crisis, Toynbee recognized its shortcomings: Essentially derivative, Herodianism is rarely creative or emotionally satisfying; and more important, it can only promise salvation to a small segment of the imperiled society. While colonialism and modernization have brought many members of ruling Arab elites to skepticism concerning the revealed truths of Islam, the conversion of these few cosmopolitans has only reinforced the faith of the masses, who see their own poverty and the dependence of their countries as the work of infidels and of fellow Muslims in
